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A GLASS-HALF-EMPTY APPROACH 
TO SECURITIES REGULATION 
WENDY GERWICK COUTURE* 
ABSTRACT 
 In this Article, I propose a novel approach, which I call the 
“glass-half-empty” approach, to analyze the appropriate bounda-
ries of securities regulation.  This approach assumes a baseline of 
“full” regulation and then analyzes which regulations should be 
stripped away because the costs exceed the benefits.  This is the 
opposite of the traditional approach, which assumes a baseline of 
zero regulation, identifies a market failure, and then weighs the 
costs and benefits of regulatory intervention. 
 Although, in theory, the two approaches should reach the same 
conclusions about the appropriate bounds of securities regulation, 
the glass-half-empty approach yields new insights because it is a 
clearer way to identify boundary lines in a heavily-regulated field, 
reveals areas that have been overlooked under the traditional ap-
proach, is more likely to result in a coherent regulatory scheme 
than the current piecemeal approach, and defrays any bias against 
adding regulatory burdens that may infect the glass-half-full ap-
proach.  The glass-half-empty approach, when applied to the fun-
damental components of securities regulation, supports several 
dramatic reforms to the current boundaries of securities regula-
tion. 
 I hope that the glass-half-empty approach, alongside the tradi-
tional approach, will become an integral part of future scholarly 
analysis about the appropriate bounds of securities regulation and 
that the insights that this approach reveals will be incorporated 
into future reforms of securities regulation, leading to a more com-
prehensive, coherent, and unbiased regulatory scheme that fur-
thers accuracy in securities pricing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The traditional approach to securities regulation assumes a baseline of 
zero regulation, identifies a market failure, and then weighs the costs and 
benefits of regulatory intervention.  Under the nomenclature of this Article, 
this is a “glass-half-full” approach, which examines what types of regulations 
should be added to solve problems that arise in the absence of regulation. 
I take the opposite approach, assuming a baseline of “full” regulation 
and then analyzing which regulations should be stripped away.  I dub this the 
“glass-half-empty” approach to securities regulation.  The glass-half-empty 
approach requires three steps.  First, define “full” regulation.  This definition 
should attempt to hypothesize what it would look like to fully regulate the 
field, without being confined by political reality.  Second, design a method-
ology for removing regulation from this hypothesized “full” state.  Third, 
applying that methodology, carve away components of “full” regulation and 
compare the resulting boundary lines to the current regulatory scheme, which 
was crafted under a glass-half-full approach. 
Although, in theory, the two approaches should reach the same conclu-
sions about the appropriate bounds of securities regulation, the glass-half-
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empty approach yields new insights.  It is a clearer way to identify boundary 
lines in a heavily regulated field and reveals areas that have been overlooked 
under the traditional approach.  Furthermore, it is more likely to result in a 
coherent regulatory scheme than the current piecemeal approach, and it de-
frays any bias against adding regulatory burdens that may infect the glass-
half-full approach.  As such, I contend that no analysis of the appropriate 
boundaries of securities regulation is complete without applying both ap-
proaches. 
The glass-half-empty approach, when applied to the fundamental com-
ponents of securities regulation, supports several dramatic reforms to the cur-
rent boundaries of the field.  In particular, this approach recommends the ad-
dition of several new forms of regulation, including: (1) federal merit review 
of private offerings to unsophisticated investors; (2) a revision to the trigger 
for mandatory disclosure; (3) the abolition of the safe harbor from liability 
for mandated forward-looking statements; (4) a change in the focus of liabil-
ity standards from the context of disclosure to the content of disclosure; and 
(5) the imposition of damage caps for misrepresentations and omissions made 
to the secondary market. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  In Part I, I present the glass-half-
empty approach, delineating the steps and rationales for this new analytical 
tool.  In Part II, I argue that the primary goal of securities regulation is to 
achieve price accuracy.  Then, in Parts III, IV, and V, in light of the goal of 
achieving price accuracy, I apply the glass-half-empty approach to three fun-
damental areas of securities regulation: regulation of offerings; mandatory 
disclosure by public companies; and public company liability for misrepre-
sentations and omissions.  I have chosen these areas because they are at the 
core of securities regulation, unlike those components of the federal securi-
ties laws, such as proxy solicitation and shareholder proposals, which James 
J. Park has aptly categorized as “federal corporate law.”1  I compare the in-
sights yielded by this approach to other scholars’ proposed reforms in these 
core areas of securities regulation, which were crafted under the glass-half-
full approach.  In closing, I argue that the glass-half-empty approach, in con-
junction with the traditional glass-half-full approach, should become an inte-
gral part of future scholarly analysis about the appropriate bounds of securi-
ties regulation and that the reforms it supports should be incorporated into 
the future regulation of securities. 
I.  GLASS-HALF-EMPTY APPROACH 
The traditional approach to securities regulation assumes a baseline of 
zero regulation, “identif[ies] a market failure,” and then “weigh[s] the costs 
                                                          
 1.  James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64 
UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
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and benefits of . . . regulatory intervention.”2  For example, under the classic 
articulation, issuers of securities are required to disclose certain material in-
formation to investors in order to address information asymmetries that 
would exist absent regulation.3  Under the nomenclature of this Article, this 
is a “glass-half-full” approach, which examines what regulations are required 
to solve problems that arise in the absence of regulation. 
I take the opposite approach, assuming a baseline of “full” regulation 
and then analyzing which regulations should be stripped away.  I dub this the 
“glass-half-empty” approach to securities regulation.  Dale Arthur Oesterle 
has colorfully compared this approach to stripping a race car: 
Should We Work From Top Down or Bottom Up?  As every ama-
teur race car driver knows, when competing in a production based 
racing class, you can purchase a production car and strip it down 
to race trim or purchase spare parts and build a car from the frame 
up.  Most do the former; it is less expensive and takes less time, 
and you are less likely to leave something major out.4 
I argue that a comprehensive analysis of securities regulation requires not 
only the current glass-half-full approach, but also the complementary glass-
half-empty approach. 
The glass-half-empty approach requires three steps.  First, one must de-
fine “full” regulation.  This definition should be an attempt to hypothesize 
what it would look like to fully regulate the field, without being confined by 
political reality.  Second, one must design a methodology for removing reg-
ulation from this hypothesized “full” state.  Third, applying that methodol-
ogy, one must carve away components of “full” regulation, comparing the 
resulting boundary lines to the current regulatory scheme, which was crafted 
under a glass-half-full approach. 
In theory, the glass-half-full and the glass-half-empty approaches 
should yield the same conclusions about the appropriate bounds of securities 
regulation.  In other words, using Professor Oesterle’s analogy, they should 
result in the same race car.  In practice, however, the glass-half-empty ap-
proach reveals new insights.  First, the glass-half-empty approach is some-
times a clearer way to identify boundary lines than the glass-half-full ap-
proach.  For example, as Frederick Schauer has argued in the context of the 
                                                          
 2.  Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public 
Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 146 (2004). 
 3.  See e.g., Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the 
Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 649–50 (1995) (ex-
plaining that “the primary policy of the federal securities laws involves the remediation of infor-
mation asymmetries” by mandating disclosure). 
 4.  Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Require-
ment for Publicly Traded Corporations: “Are We There Yet?”, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 138 
(1998). 
 364 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:360 
First Amendment, “[i]f we examine the speech that the First Amendment ig-
nores, we can begin to perceive the boundaries of the First Amendment.”5  
Likewise, in light of the vast array of regulations governing securities, a focus 
on the areas where regulation is not merited is potentially more helpful in 
discerning the appropriate boundaries of securities regulation than a focus on 
the areas where regulation is merited.  Second, the glass-half-empty approach 
may highlight areas that the glass-half full approach has overlooked.  Third, 
the glass-half-empty approach is more likely to result in a coherent regulatory 
scheme.  After all, “a heaping of individual rules” poses the risk of “internal 
incoherence.”6  Finally, the glass-half-empty approach defrays any bias 
against adding regulatory burdens, which may affect the analysis under the 
glass-half-full approach.  Therefore, the glass-half-empty approach has the 
potential to reveal areas that should be regulated either more or less strin-
gently, or deregulated altogether. 
To the extent that the glass-half-empty approach and the current glass-
half-full approach suggest different boundary lines for securities regulation, 
one must determine the reason for the discrepancy.  If the glass-half-empty 
approach identifies overlooked areas, areas of internal incoherence, or areas 
left untouched because of anti-regulatory bias, the discrepancy would recom-
mend a change to current regulation.  If, however, the discrepancy is a reflec-
tion of underlying uncertainty, it would tee up a policy discussion about the 
appropriate regulatory response to that uncertainty.  For example, Brett 
McDonnell, drawing from the competing insights of Friedrich Hayek, Mi-
chael Oakeshott, and John Maynard Keynes on the appropriate role of regu-
lation in the face of uncertainty, has argued for “cowardly interventions” that 
would “identify[] the biggest problems that we currently face and address[] 
those problems with limited new rules informed by best practice and subject 
to constant re-evaluation.”7 
Notably, although most of securities regulation is crafted under the 
glass-half-full approach, Congress has, in certain areas, codified the glass-
half-empty approach.  For example, the Securities Act broadly prohibits all 
offers and sales of securities absent the filing of a registration statement8 and 
then strips that prohibition away for certain securities and transactions.9  Sim-
ilarly, state blue sky laws broadly coexist alongside the federal securities laws 
and then are stripped away via federal preemption or preclusion in certain 
                                                          
 5.  Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004). 
 6.  Oesterle, supra note 4, at 184. 
 7.  Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a Fi-
nancial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 3, 5 (2011). 
 8.  15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012). 
 9.  Id. §§ 77c–77d. 
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defined areas.10  Therefore, as a corollary to my thesis, a comprehensive anal-
ysis of these areas of securities regulation should entail not only the current 
glass-half-empty approach, but also a glass-half-full approach. 
Finally, it is important to reiterate the appropriate role of the glass-half-
empty approach.  First, I argue that the glass-half-empty approach should 
supplement, not replace, the current glass-half-full approach.  Relying on 
only the glass-half-empty approach would pose its own set of problems, in-
cluding the potential for over-regulation.  Second, I argue that once appropri-
ate boundaries are identified using the glass-half-empty approach, those 
boundaries should continue to be implemented under the current glass-half-
full approach.  Although securities could actually be regulated under the 
glass-half-empty approach as some countries like Australia and New Zealand 
have done,11 such a dramatic reconfiguration of the current regime, however, 
is unnecessary. 
II.  PRIMARY GOAL OF REGULATION OF OFFERINGS, MANDATORY 
DISCLOSURE, AND PUBLIC COMPANY LIABILITY 
Any analysis of the appropriate scope of securities regulation—includ-
ing the glass-half-empty approach—must begin with the central purpose of 
that regulation.  I argue that the primary goal of securities regulation is to 
achieve price accuracy. 
Securities prices are accurate when they reflect fundamental (or intrin-
sic) value.12  In other words, a securities price is accurate when it represents 
the discounted value of future cash flows to which the securities holder will 
                                                          
 10.  Id. §§ 77p, 77r, 77r–1; id. § 78bb. 
 11.  Oesterle, supra note 4, at 137. 
 12.  Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 
DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (characterizing the creation of “stock markets in which the market price 
of a stock corresponds to its fundamental value” as one “principal goal of securities laws”); Donald 
C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 747, 781 (1985) [hereinafter Langevoort, Information Technology] (“By providing investors 
with the information necessary to make knowledgeable investment decisions, mandatory disclosure 
is designed to ensure that the market price truly reflects the intrinsic value of the security.”); cf. 
Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding’s Curious Conundrum, 7 OHIO ST. 
ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 373, 427 (2012) (describing “[h]elping investors translate information into 
price” as “the fundamental role of securities law”). 
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be entitled.13  Price accuracy is admittedly an elusive concept because it de-
pends on a prediction of future events.14  Even so, that does not mean that 
securities regulation should not attempt to achieve it, even if imperfectly. 
Price accuracy is the primary goal of securities regulation because, gen-
erally speaking, accurate securities prices promote the efficient allocation of 
capital.  Accurate pricing of securities at the time of offering, specifically, 
directly affects allocative efficiency.15  If the cost of capital to pursue a pro-
ject is aligned with the social cost of investing savings in that project, “sav-
ings are allocated more efficiently, going more to the most promising pro-
posed projects in the economy.”16  For this reason, securities offerings have 
“a special economic significance.”17  Accurate pricing of securities in the 
secondary market does not directly affect allocative efficiency because the 
proceeds of secondary market transactions do not inure to the issuer; rather, 
the issuer’s management has discretion in determining investment activity 
post-issuance.18  Secondary market prices do, however, indirectly affect al-
locative efficiency by influencing management’s exercise of that discretion 
in three ways.19  First, secondary market prices can affect the terms on which 
intermediaries are willing to extend financing.20  Second, secondary market 
prices can affect the willingness of management to use debt financing to fi-
nance a project.21  Third, secondary market prices can convey information to 
management about the advisability of investment opportunities.22 
                                                          
 13.  Alicia J. Davis, Market Efficiency and the Problem of Retail Flight, 20 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 36, 43–44 (2014) (“Share prices are accurate when they reflect fundamental corporate value.  
They do this by incorporating information that predicts future cash flows to shareholders over the 
life of the firm.”); Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: 
The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 344 (2003). 
 14.  Robert G. Newkirk, Comment, Sufficient Efficiency: Fraud on the Market in the Initial 
Public Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1991); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital 
Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 914 (1989). 
 15.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 734 (1984). 
 16.  Fox et al., supra note 13, at 339; see also Kahan, supra note 12, at 1006 (explaining that, 
if securities are issued at inaccurate prices, funds may flow to unprofitable projects rather than lu-
crative ones). 
 17.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE ’33 AND ’34 ACTS 60 (1969). 
 18.  Id. at 60; James Dow & Gary Gorton, Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: 
Is There a Connection?, 52 J. FIN. 1087, 1087 (1997); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being 
Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 613, 694 (1988). 
 19.  Fox et al, supra note 13, at 367 (analyzing the results of several studies and concluding 
that “more accurate share prices improve the quality of choice among new proposed investment 
projects in the economy”). 
 20.  Id. at 341. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Dow & Gorton, supra note 18, at 1105. 
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Further, accuracy of securities prices protects investors by ensuring that 
they invest at “fair” prices,23 which, in turn, increases liquidity and the flow 
of capital to the market.  If investors purchase securities at prices that accu-
rately reflect their intrinsic value at the time of purchase, they are protected 
from paying more than securities are worth.24  As explained by Stephen Choi, 
“[s]o long as the market price reflects a company’s investment risk, even un-
sophisticated investors are compensated ex ante.”25  In turn, if investors are 
confident that they are investing at fair prices, they will be more willing to 
invest in securities, increasing the flow of capital to businesses.26  In a classic 
articulation of the relationship between fair prices and an individual’s will-
ingness to invest, as stated by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,27 
“it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on 
market integrity.  Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap 
game?”28  In addition, if investors are confident that prices are fair, they will 
be more willing to trade, increasing liquidity.29  Increased liquidity benefits 
all investors by reducing the transaction costs of trading and enabling inves-
tors to adjust their portfolios.30 
Additionally, accurate securities prices reduce the likelihood of bubbles, 
resultant crashes, and the ripple effects of crashes on the real economy.31  As 
                                                          
 23.  George T. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 151–52 (1973) (arguing that a stock price 
that reflects an “unbiased estimat[ion] of [its] intrinsic value” is “fair” because an investor who 
decides to trade the security “can be assured that the market price has discounted completely the 
financial information”). 
 24.  Fischel, supra note 14, at 911–12. 
 25.  Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 279, 303 (2000). 
 26.  Davis, supra note 13, at 40 (noting that “declining confidence in U.S. markets by American 
citizens” as a cause of retail investors’ exodus from the markets); Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road 
Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case for Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 647, 688 (2010) (stating that “[f]aith in the integrity of our capital markets is essential if 
businesses are to receive the funding they need from investors”); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers 
and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 154–55 (2006). 
 27.  485 U.S. 224 (1988).  
 28.  Id. at 246–47 (quoting Schlanger v. Four–Phase Systems Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
 29.  Kahan, supra note 12, at 1018–19 (“[A]n investor who has no special reason to believe that 
XYZ Corp. is undervalued or overvalued, but knows that others have such reasons, would expect to 
lose. . . .  Thus, a rational unsophisticated investor will tend to refrain from trading—and suffer a 
corresponding reduction in the liquidity of her investments.”); see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 765 (2006) (“A 
higher risk of asymmetric information implies a larger bid-ask spread, and lower liquidity.”). 
 30.  Kahan, supra note 12, at 1019–20 (explaining that a “decline in liquidity” imposes “trans-
action costs of trading; and costs of holding non-optimal portfolios”). 
 31.  Kahan, supra note 12, at 1035 (explaining that inaccurate securities prices can “increase 
the likelihood of major crashes, and therefore raise the possibility of recessions”); Morrissey, supra 
note 26, at 648–49 (discussing how speculative investments led to the 2008 financial crisis). 
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explained by Ronald J. Colombo, “[t]his concern is not so much about pro-
tecting investors from themselves, but about protecting everyone from those 
who would invest imprudently.”32  The impacts of market crashes reach far 
beyond investors themselves, impacting jobs, availability of credit, and over-
all economic activity.33 
Finally, accurate securities prices in the secondary market can reduce 
agency costs by providing feedback on management decisionmaking.  That 
information aids shareholders when exercising their voting rights and enforc-
ing managers’ fiduciary duties.34  In addition, it increases “the threat of hos-
tile takeover when managers engage in non-share-value-maximizing behav-
ior”35 and provides lenders with information about manager opportunism.36  
All of these actors, informed by an accurate share price, have the power to 
rein in misbehaving managers. 
For these reasons, I contend that price accuracy is the primary goal of 
regulating offerings, mandatory disclosure, and public company liability.  
However, this contention is far from uncontroversial.  Other scholars have 
posited different primary goals, such as market efficiency, an optimal level 
of securities analysis, protection of investors, and reduction of agency costs.  
For the reasons below, I argue that each of these alternate articulations is 
intrinsically related to price accuracy and that, in fact, price accuracy best 
describes the primary goal of regulation. 
First, many scholars argue that the primary goal of securities regulation 
is market efficiency.  For example, Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky 
contend in their article, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation: “[S]chol-
arly analysis of securities regulation must proceed on the assumption that the 
ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain efficient financial markets 
and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the economy.”37  They 
further explain, “[t]he two main determinants of market efficiency are share 
price accuracy and financial liquidity.”38 
The goal of market efficiency fails to encapsulate the breadth of securi-
ties subject to regulation, however, because it applies only to securities that 
are publicly traded, either on exchanges or over-the-counter.  Many securities 
                                                          
 32.  Ronald J. Colombo, Merit Regulation Via the Suitability Rules, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 1, 6 
(2013). 
 33.  See Ripken, supra note 26, at 198. 
 34.  Fox et al., supra note 13, at 339–40. 
 35.  Id. at 340. 
 36.  Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 28 n.66 (explaining that lenders can provide a check on managers by withholding credit 
or calling loans). 
 37.  Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 713. 
 38.  Id. at 714. 
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are never intended to be publicly traded, and yet they are regulated as well.39  
Therefore, as a motivating principle for securities regulation, the goal of mar-
ket efficiency is under-inclusive. 
That is not to say that market efficiency is irrelevant to price accuracy; 
rather, market efficiency is a means of accomplishing share price accuracy.  
Under the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (“ECMH”), in an efficient 
market, all publicly available information is reflected in a share’s price.40  
This “informational efficiency”41 is an approximation of the share’s intrinsic 
value,42 otherwise known as “value efficiency.”43  Therefore, the goal of mar-
ket efficiency is consistent with the goal of price accuracy, but it is a means 
of achieving that goal, not an end in and of itself. 
Second, other scholars argue that the primary goal of securities regula-
tion is to ensure the optimal level of securities research by analysts and other 
market professionals.44  For example, John C. Coffee, Jr. argues that, “if mar-
ket forces are inadequate to produce the socially optimal supply of research, 
then a regulatory response may be justified.”45  Again, I do not disagree that 
securities analysis is important.  However, its importance is derived from its 
effect on share price accuracy.46  Like market efficiency, securities analysis 
is a means to accomplish share price accuracy. 
Third, many scholars argue that the primary goal of securities regulation 
is investor protection.  Not only does regulation prevent investors from being 
victimized by fraud or harmed by unsuitably risky investments, it arguably 
                                                          
 39.  Stout, supra note 18, at 618 n.18 (citing Joel Seligman, The Future of the National Market 
System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79 (1984)). 
 40.  Id. at 619; Shannon Rose Selden, (Self-)Policing the Market: Congress’s Flawed Approach 
to Securities Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 65 (2006). 
 41.  Fischel, supra note 14, at 912–13 (describing “trading-rule efficiency” as dependent “on 
the speed with which market prices reflect publicly-available information and whether the price 
reaction to new information is without bias”); Newkirk, supra note 14, at 1394 (explaining that an 
information efficient market “is simply one which quickly incorporates new information into a se-
curity’s price”); Stout, supra note 18, at 619 (explaining that the efficiency postulated by the ECMH 
is informational efficiency). 
 42.  Fischel, supra note 14, at 914–15; Fox et al., supra note 13, at 349; Robert L. Knauss, A 
Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 610 (1964); Selden, supra note 40, at 
65.  But see Stout, supra note 18, at 697 (arguing that even informationally efficient markets may 
result in stock prices that do not reflect intrinsic value).  
 43.  Newkirk, supra note 14, at 1394 (explaining that a “value efficient market . . . sets the price 
for a security at its ‘true’ worth”). 
 44.  See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 711 (“This Article posits that the essential 
role of securities regulation is to create a competitive market for sophisticated professional investors 
and analysts (information traders).”). 
 45.  Coffee, Jr., supra note 15, at 728–29.  
 46.  Id. at 724 (“[M]ost accounts explaining the stock market’s efficiency assign a substantial 
responsibility to the competition among analysts for securities information.”); Goshen & Par-
chomovsky, supra note 29, at 715–16 (“[B]y protecting information traders, securities regulation 
represents the highest form of market integrity, which ensures accurate pricing and superior liquid-
ity to all investors.”). 
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encourages investors to purchase securities in the first place, leading to a 
more robust capital market.47  Some critics of the investor protection ra-
tionale, like Professors Goshen and Parchomovsky, disparage this goal as na-
ïve, noting, “[a]ny serious examination of the role and function of securities 
regulation must sidestep the widespread, yet misguided, belief that securities 
regulation aims at protecting the common investor.”48  Unlike these critics of 
the investor protection goal, I do not discount the importance of investor pro-
tection.  Rather, as discussed above, I contend that the best way to protect 
investors is to achieve price accuracy.49 
Finally, some scholars posit that reducing agency costs is the primary 
goal of securities regulation.  For example, Paul G. Mahoney argues: “[T]he 
principal purpose of mandatory disclosure is to address certain agency prob-
lems that arise between corporate promoters and investors, and between cor-
porate managers and shareholders.”50  Again, I do not disagree that reduction 
of agency costs is important, but it is doubly interrelated with price accuracy.  
First, as recognized by Donald C. Langevoort, the risk of agency costs is a 
component of share valuation because a “valuation decision is impossible 
without an assessment of the risk that incumbent management will divert to 
itself the otherwise expected stream of earnings.”51  Second, as discussed 
above,52 accurate share prices help reduce agency costs.53  Thus, price accu-
racy is both inseparable from agency costs and a means of reducing those 
costs. 
Therefore, I contend that price accuracy is the primary goal of the regu-
lation of offerings, mandatory disclosure, and public company liability.  It 
promotes allocative efficiency, protects investors, reduces the likelihood of 
market crashes, and reduces agency costs.  Market efficiency and securities 
analysis are means of achieving price accuracy; therefore, while these are 
important components of securities regulation, their importance derives from 
their effect on price accuracy.  With the goal of price accuracy in mind, I will 
                                                          
 47.  Choi, supra note 25, at 280. 
 48.  Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 29, at 713. 
 49.  See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text. 
 50.  Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1047, 1048 (1995); see also Coffee, Jr., supra note 15, at 752 (explaining that even “diversified 
investors benefit” from reduced agency costs because those costs are “an element of systemic risk 
that portfolio diversification cannot itself eliminate”). 
 51.  Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection: The 
SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1152–53 (2003) [hereinafter 
Langevoort, Managing]; see also Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why 
Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1365 (1999) (explaining that, if 
the market expects management to act in shareholders’ best interest, it translates into a higher market 
price); Oesterle, supra note 4, at 205 (explaining that, if investors are concerned about fraud, they 
will respond by discounting the price they are willing to pay). 
 52.  See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 53.  See Guttentag, supra note 2, at 162; Palmiter, supra note 36, at 28. 
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now apply the glass-half-empty approach to three fundamental areas of secu-
rities regulation: (1) regulation of offerings; (2) mandatory disclosure by pub-
lic companies; and (3) public company liability for misrepresentations and 
omissions. 
III.  REGULATION OF OFFERINGS 
In this Part, I apply the glass-half-empty approach to the regulation of 
offerings.  First, I define the hypothetical state of “full” regulation.  Second, 
I propose a methodology to remove regulation from that hypothetical state.  
Finally, I apply the methodology to four categories of offerings, arguing that 
the glass-half-empty approach supports the current regulation of offerings, 
except in the context of private offerings to unsophisticated investors. 
A.  Definition of “Full” Regulation of Offerings 
The first step of the glass-half-empty approach is to hypothesize “full” 
regulation of offerings.  I contend that full regulation of offerings would im-
pose mandatory disclosure and federal merit review on all offerings.  In order 
to envision this regulatory scheme, it is helpful to revisit the fork in the road 
that Congress faced when enacting the Securities Act of 1933.  Congress was 
confronted with a “battle of the philosophies” between a disclosure-based 
system and a merit-based system.54  The original draft of the Securities Act 
adopted a merit-based system, similar to most of the blue sky laws then on 
the books.55  In a message to Congress, however, President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt rejected that approach in favor of a disclosure-based system.56  Ulti-
mately, Congress chose to regulate securities offerings via disclosure without 
any merit review.57  Although that choice was criticized at the time, including 
by future Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas,58 the choice has per-
meated modern notions of securities regulation.  Indeed, the SEC has de-
scribed disclosure as the “keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities 
                                                          
 54.  1 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 257–325 (4th ed. 2006) (describing the 
“battle of the philosophies” between a disclosure-based system and a merit-based system). 
 55.  Morrissey, supra note 26, at 679. 
 56.  FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF TRAFFIC IN INVESTMENT SECURITIES IN INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1–2 (1933) (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt as say-
ing, “[o]f course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which might be 
construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their 
value will be maintained or that the properties they represent will earn profit”). 
 57.  Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against 
Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495, 528 (1984). 
 58.  William O. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE L. REV. 522, 528 (1934) (“This is 
no more and no less than an indication of the futility of placing hope for substantial progress merely 
on the truth about securities.  Real protection must rest on broader bases.”). 
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legislation.”59  As a consequence, the potential for federal merit review has 
received little scholarly attention.60  A hypothetical state of full regulation 
would return to that fork in the road and take both paths: imposing mandatory 
disclosure and federal merit review. 
Both mandatory disclosure and merit review are attempts to achieve 
price accuracy, but via a different intermediary.61  Mandatory disclosure the-
oretically achieves price accuracy with the market serving as intermediary.  
Companies are required to disclose “items indispensable to any accurate 
judgment upon the value of the security.”62  Sophisticated investors trade on 
the basis of the disclosed information.63  Assuming that there are a sufficient 
number of sophisticated investors trading in a liquid market, the market price 
theoretically reflects their combined assessment of the value of the security,64 
approximating price accuracy.65  Price accuracy will be diminished, however, 
if there are too many unsophisticated traders, whose “speculative noise” can-
not be fully counteracted by the sophisticated traders,66 or if the underlying 
information is so complex that even sophisticated investors cannot fully in-
corporate that information into their trades.67 
Merit review, on the other hand, interposes a regulator as intermediary.  
The regulator has the power to prevent an offering altogether68 or to require 
changes in the structure before the offering can proceed.69  A regulator per-
forming merit review typically analyzes whether an offering is “fair, just, and 
                                                          
 59.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES, H.R. DOC. NO. 
88-95, pt. 3, at 1 (1st Sess. 1963). 
 60.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (“There is little current literature on government certification of securities 
quality because, until recently, disclosure was seen as the complete answer.”).  But see Morrissey, 
supra note 26. 
 61.  Colombo, supra note 32, at 7 (“The difference being is that the disclosure approach allows 
investors and the market to determine whether a given offering is fair or excessively risky, whereas 
it is a government official who makes that determination in merit regulation.”). 
 62.  H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 3–4. 
 63.  Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 17–18. 
 64.  Douglas, supra note 58, at 524; Selden, supra note 40, at 64–65; see also Fox et al., supra 
note 13, at 368 (studying the impact of management discussion and analysis (“MD&A”) disclosure 
and concluding that the data “suggests that share prices did in fact become more informed as a result 
of the enhanced MD&A requirements”). 
 65.  See supra text accompanying notes 40–43. 
 66.  Fox et al., supra note 13, at 348–49. 
 67.  Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 36 (arguing that the “complexity of structured transactions 
undermines the long-held disclosure paradigm”). 
 68.  Mark A. Sargent, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 
785, 805 (1986). 
 69.  Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Com-
merce?, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 116 (1987). 
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equitable,”70 with the offering price as a key component of that analysis.71  
Merit review of price aligns “as effectively as possible[,] the risk level and 
the initial offering price of a given issue.”72  The standards for assessing price 
include “setting the offering price as a multiple of the company’s book value, 
or comparing the multiple of the offering price to earnings to that of similar 
public companies.”73  Therefore, like disclosures into an efficient market, 
merit review of offering price arguably enhances price accuracy by aligning 
the offering price with intrinsic value.74 
B.  Methodology for Removing Offering Regulation 
The second step of the glass-half-empty approach is to develop a meth-
odology for removing regulation from the hypothetical “full” regulation of 
offerings (in other words, mandatory disclosure and federal merit review).  
Mandatory disclosure can exist without merit review, as under the current 
federal scheme.  Merit review cannot exist without disclosure, however, be-
cause no merit assessment can proceed without information about a busi-
ness’s fundamentals.75  Therefore, the methodology for removing regulation 
from the hypothetical state of full regulation should focus on whether it is 
appropriate to remove merit review.  If the marginal social costs of merit 
review, on top of mandatory disclosure, exceed the marginal social benefits, 
merit review should be stripped away.76 
Some evidence suggests that merit review, in practice, helps achieve 
price accuracy.  The data on the impact of merit review is sparse, however, 
                                                          
 70.  Sargent, supra note 68, at 803. 
 71.  Id. at 824 (“First is a concern that the offering price be fair.  This concern is reflected most 
obviously in the limits on the price-earnings multiple and on the degree of dilution to the public 
investor.  It is also reflected, however, in the merit concern with cheap stock.”). 
 72.  Jay T. Brandi, The Silver Lining in Blue Sky Laws: The Effects of Merit Regulation on 
Common Stock Returns and Market Efficiency, 12 J. CORP. L. 713, 728 (1987). 
 73.  Karmel, supra note 69, at 116; see also Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the 
Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 563–64 (1985); Sargent, supra note 68, at 
811–12. 
 74.  Brandi, supra note 72, at 728–29 (“As merit stringency increases, the market price of a 
given issue should be aligned more closely with the true intrinsic price on the first day of offering.”); 
see also Sargent, supra note 68, at 824 (discussing the rationales for merit review generally and 
stating, “[f]airness to the investor, therefore, demands that the regulator adjust the offering price so 
that the security is more likely to be worth what the investor pays for it”). 
 75.  Karmel, supra note 69, at 116 (recognizing that “merit regulation is not necessarily anti-
thetical to disclosure regulation”); Sargent, supra note 68, at 801 (emphasizing that “jurisdictions 
with merit authority also have the authority to review the adequacy of disclosure”). 
 76.  See Karmel, supra note 69, at 106 (“Merit regulation clearly imposes burdens on capital 
formation.  The question is whether the costs added to the underwriting process by [merit review] 
compliance outweigh whatever benefits [merit review] laws provide to investors or the securities 
markets.”). 
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because not all states have merit review statutes77 and, since 1996, state reg-
ulation of most securities offerings has been preempted.78  Nevertheless, in 
1987, Professor Brandi studied the effects of state merit regulation on initial 
public offerings of common stock and found that “[t]he issues complying 
with the least stringent merit regulations come to market with prices which 
require more market adjustment than those issues from strong merit states.”79  
This relationship between more stringent merit review and post-issuance 
market price adjustment has two possible—perhaps interrelated—explana-
tions.  First, merit review possibly resulted in a more accurate offering price, 
thus requiring less price adjustment.  Second, as recognized by Professor 
Brandi, “the relationship between necessary market price adjustment and the 
degree of merit regulation perhaps implies that the level to which an issue 
complies is, or can be, viewed as important information by the investing pub-
lic.”80  In other words, regardless of whether the offering price was actually 
more accurate, the investing public may have viewed it as such. 
At the same time, merit review imposes substantial costs.  Merit review 
erects an additional barrier for issuers seeking to raise capital: “Not only must 
securities issuers convince the capital markets of their offering’s worthiness, 
but they have the added hurdle (and costs) of having to convince a regulator 
as well.”81  That barrier slows down the issuance of securities82 and imposes 
additional expenses, both on the issuer and the regulator.83  The regulator 
must possess sophisticated technical expertise in order to engage in merit re-
view,84 and there is the ever-present risk of regulator corruption or bias.85  To 
the extent that private-sector analysts would potentially cover the security, it 
is questionable whether the regulator would perform this function better.86  
                                                          
 77.  For example, the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) has 
identified twenty-seven states and Puerto Rico as jurisdictions with merit review statutes.  See State 
Filing Requirements: Filing Fees and State Contact Information, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, 
http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/coordinated-review/regulatio n-a-of-
ferings/state-filing-requirements/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (performing a multi-state survey that 
excluded Georgia, Tennessee, Wyoming, and Vermont).  The NASAA also notes that New Jersey 
is a “quasi-disclosure” jurisdiction and that its securities regulator makes merit comments in addi-
tion to disclosure-related comments.  New Jersey, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, 
http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/coordinated-review/regulation-a-of-
ferings/state-filing-requirements/new-jersey/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2016).  
 78.  15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012). 
 79.  Brandi, supra note 72, at 734. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Colombo, supra note 32, at 8. 
 82.  Sargent, supra note 68, at 802. 
 83.  Douglas, supra note 58, at 532 (arguing that a governmental agency engaged in merit re-
view “would transcend in size and complexity any which we have known to date”); Knauss, supra 
note 42, at 615; Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 26. 
 84.  Sargent, supra note 68, at 831 (arguing that merit regulation “requires a staff of persons 
who are both gifted financial analysts and ethical philosophers”). 
 85.  Colombo, supra note 32, at 8. 
 86.  Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 27. 
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Moreover, there is a risk that the presence of a government regulator would 
“actually undermine the market for private securities analysts.”87  Further, 
start-up businesses and companies with new technologies or business models 
may have difficulty passing merit review,88 which might ultimately serve as 
a disincentive to innovation.89  Finally, although more of a philosophical cost 
than an actual cost, many scholars argue that merit review is unduly pater-
nalistic,90 and even “inconsistent with the very essence of a capitalistic sys-
tem.”91 
When considering whether to remove merit review of offerings from the 
hypothetical state of full regulation, one must weigh the likely marginal so-
cial benefits of merit review against its marginal social costs.  If disclosure 
alone is sufficient to achieve substantial price accuracy, merit review is not 
warranted in light of the additional costs that it imposes.  This analysis de-
pends on how effective disclosure alone is in achieving price accuracy.  As 
discussed above,92 the efficacy of disclosure depends on whether there is an 
intermediary—such as the market—that operates to reflect the disclosed in-
formation in the price.93 
Therefore, in order to analyze whether to remove merit review from an 
offering, one must ask whether disclosure is sufficient to achieve price accu-
racy.  Several scholars have posed similar questions.  For example, Joan Mac-
Leod Heminway asks: “What are the limits, in particular, of disclosure regu-
lation as a vehicle for protecting investors and markets?  Do we need more 
substantive regulation?”94  Similarly, Steven L. Schwarcz recommends that 
scholars “consider whether disclosure can be buttressed by cost-effective, 
supplemental protections that minimize that asymmetry or mitigate its con-
sequences.  In this context, it should be emphasized that any such supple-
mental protections would be in addition to, not in place of, disclosure.”95  If 
disclosure is sufficient to achieve price accuracy, then merit review should 
be stripped away.  If disclosure is insufficient, however, then there may be a 
role for merit review if the marginal social costs would not exceed the mar-
ginal social benefits. 
                                                          
 87.  Id. at 27–28. 
 88.  Karmel, supra note 69, at 116; Sargent, supra note 68, at 843. 
 89.  Campbell, supra note 73, at 566. 
 90.  Id. at 565; Colombo, supra note 32, at 5; Karmel, supra note 69, at 116. 
 91.  Campbell, supra note 73, at 566. 
 92.  See supra text accompanying notes 61–67. 
 93.  See Douglas, supra note 58, at 524. 
 94.  Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: Securities Regulation 
Scholarship and Teaching in the Global Financial Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 59, 67 (2010). 
 95.  Schwarcz, supra note 60, at 23–24. 
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C.  Application of Methodology for Removing Offering Regulation 
Applying this methodology to the hypothetical state of full regulation, 
one must first consider whether disclosure alone is sufficient to achieve sub-
stantial price accuracy.  If so, then the marginal social costs of an additional 
overlay of merit review almost certainly exceed the marginal benefits.  If 
disclosure is not sufficient to approximate price accuracy, however, then 
merit review might serve a valuable function.  For purposes of this analysis, 
I will focus on four categories of offerings: (1) follow-on and Private Invest-
ment in Public Equity (“PIPE”) offerings by public companies; (2) initial 
public offerings; (3) private (non-PIPE) offerings to sophisticated investors; 
and (4) private offerings to unsophisticated investors. 
1.  Follow-On and PIPE Offerings by Public Companies 
When a public company makes a follow-on offering or a PIPE offering, 
there is a pre-existing market price that serves as a reference point against 
which to price the securities.  Because of dilution, the offering might be 
priced below the prevailing market price, but the market price sets the price 
ceiling.96  In addition, in a PIPE offering, the market price will likely be dis-
counted because of restrictions on resale.97  In this context, assuming that the 
market operates somewhat efficiently, the preconditions for mandatory dis-
closure to approximate price accuracy are present.98  Merit review in this con-
text would be superfluous,99 so its marginal costs would undoubtedly out-
weigh its marginal benefits.  Therefore, consistent with current law, follow-
on and PIPE offerings by public companies should not be subject to merit 
review. 
2.  Initial Public Offerings 
By contrast, when a company makes an initial public offering, there is 
not an existing public market to translate disclosures into price accuracy.  As 
explained by Professor Stout, “[i]n contrast to the case of a seasoned issue, 
the underwriter for an initial public offering (IPO) must set a price at a time 
when, by definition, no public market for that particular stock exists.”100  
Therefore, unless another mechanism exists in the context of IPOs to translate 
disclosure into price accuracy, disclosure alone is arguably insufficient to 
achieve price accuracy. 
                                                          
 96.  Stout, supra note 18, at 653–54; Pipe Offerings, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/pipeofferings.htm (last updated May 19, 2005). 
 97. ANNA T. PINEDO & JAMES R. TANENBAUM  MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP, FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT PIPES 7 (2016), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/FAQs 
PIPEs.pdf. 
 98.  Selden, supra note 40, at 64–65. 
 99.  Sargent, supra note 68, at 850. 
 100.  Stout, supra note 18, at 654. 
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I argue that the IPO price-setting process involves both intermediaries 
with sufficient incentives to align pricing with fundamentals and investors 
with sufficient sophistication to demand such alignment.  As a result, disclo-
sure is sufficient to achieve some degree of price accuracy.  First, underwrit-
ers, who are repeat players in the market, have a reputational incentive to 
perform fundamental analysis101 in order to price issues accurately.102  In-
deed, the SEC has acknowledged the important role of underwriters, in the 
exercise of due diligence, in ensuring that the offer price reflects the secu-
rity’s value.103  Likewise, institutional investors, who are allocated most IPO 
shares,104 are sufficiently sophisticated to perform their own fundamental 
analyses.  Therefore, the bookbuilding process, whereby the underwriter sets 
the offer price based on investors’ indications of interest,105 ensures that the 
issue price is reflective of fundamentals.106  In other words, as stated by Alan 
R. Palmiter, “market intermediaries do the dirty work for public investors to 
ensure a modicum of price fairness.”107 
Of course, IPO pricing does not achieve perfect price accuracy.  As has 
been well-documented,108 underwriters often price securities lower than what 
the market would bear—a phenomenon known as “IPO underpricing.”  Un-
derwriters have several incentives to underprice.  First, underwriters maxim-
ize their own compensation by ensuring that all of the shares sell, causing 
                                                          
 101.  Newkirk, supra note 14, at 1413 (explaining that “[t]he underwriter will typically analyze 
the price to earning ratios of similar companies, the issuer’s expected growth, the risks of the busi-
ness, managerial strength, and existing market conditions”); Palmiter, supra note 12, at 373 (dis-
cussing how pricing between the underwriter and the issuer uses “various valuation models, multi-
ples and comparables and indications of market demand”). 
 102.  Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 549, 620 (1984) (explaining that the underwriter “represents to the market . . . that it has 
evaluated the issuer’s product and good faith and that it is prepared to stake its reputation on the 
value of the innovation”). 
 103.  SEC Hot Issues: Meaningful Disclosure, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,005, 16,006 (Aug. 8, 1972) (cod-
ified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 240, 249). 
 104.  E.g., Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
711, 712–13 (2005) (explaining that, during the 1999-2000 period in which there was high demand 
for IPO shares, “underwriters allocated the majority of IPO shares to regular customers, mostly 
institutional investors”); Laurie Krigman & Wendy Jeffus, IPO Pricing as a Function of Your In-
vestment Banks’ Past Mistakes: The Case of Facebook, 38 J. CORP. FIN. 335, 336 (2016) (explaining 
that seventy-four percent of Facebook’s IPO shares were sold to institutional investors). 
 105.  Christine Hurt, Initial Public Offerings and the Failed Promise of Disintermediation, 2 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 703, 724 (2008) (explaining that, based on investors’ indications of 
interest, “the underwriter sets the price for the original IPO shares, determines which road show 
attendees will receive shares at the original IPO price, and determines the number of shares each 
attendee will receive”). 
 106.  Newkirk, supra note 14, at 1412 (arguing that “the IPO market satisfactorily approximates 
the assumptions of the ECMH, ensuring that the market is sufficiently information efficient to gen-
erate reliable prices”). 
 107.  Palmiter, supra note 12, at 383. 
 108.  Stout, supra note 18, at 657 (“Empirical studies confirm that underwriters systematically 
fail to set offering prices which conform to eventual equilibrium market-clearing prices.”). 
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them to “err on the side of underpricing.”109  Second, underwriters may be 
motivated to foster additional investment banking or brokerage business by 
allocating shares to institutional investors at below-market prices,110 allowing 
those investors to reap immediate profits upon resale to retail investors.111  
Relatedly, a recent study by Laurie Krigman and Wendy Jeffus of underwrit-
ers involved in the Facebook IPO suggests that underwriters may view IPOs 
in the aggregate, underpricing a particular issue to compensate their institu-
tional client base for other previous issues that failed to provide those clients 
with an instant profit.112 
Despite the failure of IPO pricing to translate disclosures into perfect 
price accuracy, merit review is not warranted in this context because of the 
high costs of merit review and the likely minimal impact that such review 
would have on IPO pricing.  Therefore, consistent with current law, merit 
review should be stripped away from the hypothetical state of full regulation, 
leaving behind mandatory disclosure. 
3.  Private (non-PIPE) Offerings to Sophisticated Investors 
Like IPOs, private (non-PIPE) offerings to sophisticated investors are 
not priced in relation to a prevailing market price because no such market 
exists.113  Therefore, unless another mechanism exists to translate disclosure 
into price accuracy, disclosure alone is arguably insufficient to achieve price 
accuracy.  In these offerings, unlike in the context of IPOs, there is not nec-
essarily an intermediary to ensure price accuracy.  Often, investors “must 
fend for themselves in deciding whether the price of the offered securities is 
a fair one.”114  Therefore, the question of whether merit review should be 
removed from the hypothetical state of full regulation in this context depends 
on whether these sophisticated investors translate disclosure into price accu-
racy. 
Notably, I am not using the term “sophisticated” interchangeably with 
the term “accredited” in this analysis.  Under current law, most exemptions 
from registration divide investors into two categories: “accredited” and “non-
accredited.”115  Most institutional investors, consistent with their sophistica-
tion, qualify as accredited.116  Individual investors, however, are classified as 
                                                          
 109.  Id. at 660. 
 110.  Hurt, supra note 104, at 719; Krigman & Jeffus, supra note 104, at 336. 
 111.  Hurt, supra note 105, at 724. 
 112.  See generally Krigman & Jeffus, supra note 104.  The authors argued that “[t]he pricing 
behavior of the Facebook lead underwriters following the Facebook IPO suggests that banks ac-
tively manage the aggregate underpricing of IPOs over time as a means of maintaining a coalition 
of IPO investors.”  Id.  
 113.  See Fischel, supra note 14, at 912. 
 114.  Palmiter, supra note 12, at 385. 
 115.  E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2016).  
 116.  Id. § 230.501(a). 
 2017] A GLASS-HALF-EMPTY APPROACH 379 
accredited merely by virtue of satisfying (relatively modest) income and 
wealth standards.117  I do not equate individual wealth with sophistication.118  
Rather, if an individual investor satisfies the accredited investor standard, but 
does not possess financial sophistication or have a designated financial advi-
sor with such acumen, I classify that investor as “unsophisticated.”  Con-
versely, in the less likely scenario in which an individual investor fails to 
satisfy the accredited investor standard but is financially sophisticated, I clas-
sify that investor as “sophisticated.”  Indeed, in a recent report on the accred-
itation standard, the SEC recognized that accreditation is not a proxy for so-
phistication: “[T]he fact that an individual has a high net worth does not 
necessarily mean the individual is financially sophisticated, while a personal 
finance expert without requisite levels of income or net worth is not an ac-
credited investor under the current definition.”119  The SEC has also identi-
fied a series of criteria that could be used to identify sophisticated individual 
investors, including prior investment experience, professional credentials, 
and passage of an examination.120  To date, these proposed criteria have not 
been incorporated into the accredited investor definition, but the list provides 
guidance on how regulators and issuers could differentiate between unsophis-
ticated and sophisticated individual investors regardless of accreditation. 
I argue that sophisticated investors are able to exact and analyze disclo-
sures in order to ensure some degree of price accuracy for two reasons.  First, 
these investors routinely negotiate for extensive disclosures, often beyond 
those that would be required in a registration statement.121  Second, these in-
vestors possess the financial acumen to analyze those disclosures and nego-
tiate for a price supported by pricing models.122  Therefore, in this context, 
merit review would be largely superfluous and its costs would likely out-
weigh its benefits.123  As explained by Professor Colombo, in the context of 
sophisticated investors, “[i]t seems like folly, therefore, to allow a regulator 
                                                          
 117.  Id. § 230.501(a)(5) to (6). 
 118.  Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
151, 198 (2010) (discussing the disconnect between the accredited investor standard and the ability 
of those investors to protect themselves); Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive 
Promise of “Technological Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL 
& EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 22 (1998) [hereinafter Langevoort, Angels] (raising the concern that an 
investor’s high wealth or income does not necessarily translate into the ability to exercise “effective 
analytical judgment or bargaining power in direct offerings”). 
 119.  SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED 
INVESTOR” 89 (2015). 
 120.  Id. at 93–96. 
 121.  Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. 
L. REV. 583, 594 (2016); Palmiter, supra note 36 at, 21. 
 122. Johnson, supra note 118, at 191; Palmiter, supra note 12, at 373. 
 123.  See Karmel, supra note 69, at 119 (explaining that, in light of “the institutionalization of 
the securities markets,” the SEC has shifted its policy away from “consumer-oriented investor pro-
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to dictate what offerings an investor can or cannot partake in from some con-
sumer-protection rationale focused on fairness and appropriate risk.”124  In-
deed, even states with merit review statutes exclude offerings made to certain 
classes of sophisticated investors.125  Therefore, consistent with current law, 
merit review should be removed from the hypothetical state of “full” regula-
tion in the context of private offerings to sophisticated investors. 
4.  Private Offerings to Unsophisticated Investors 
Private offerings to unsophisticated investors are not priced in relation 
to a prevailing market price because no such market exists.126  Further, there 
is not likely to be an intermediary with the incentive to ensure price accu-
racy.127  The question of whether merit review should be removed from the 
hypothetical state of full regulation in this context depends on whether, like 
sophisticated investors, unsophisticated investors are able to “fend for them-
selves,”128 both by demanding disclosure and by translating such disclosure 
into an accurate price. 
I argue that, unlike sophisticated investors, unsophisticated investors 
cannot be expected to exact and analyze disclosures to ensure some degree 
of price accuracy.  First, these investors may not recognize the need for dis-
closures or have the leverage to demand additional disclosures.129  Second, 
these investors may not even read the disclosures.130  Third, even if these 
investors read the disclosures, they are unlikely to be able to use those dis-
closures to value the company.131  Fourth, these investors may be especially 
susceptible to speculative fervor.132  Finally, and somewhat ironically, the 
businesses that offer securities to unsophisticated investors are among the 
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riskiest133 and the most likely to involve outright fraud.134  Therefore, I argue 
that the disclosure regime is insufficient to achieve even an approximation of 
price accuracy in private offerings to unsophisticated investors. 
As such, when issuers make private offerings to unsophisticated inves-
tors, the marginal social costs of merit regulation arguably would not exceed 
the marginal social benefits.  On the benefit side, the SEC as merit regulator 
would serve as an intermediary to ensure some degree of price accuracy.  As 
Professor Langevoort has recognized, absent intermediation, “we might need 
some alternative strategy (for example, greater SEC or Blue Sky Law super-
vision) to offset it.”135  Merit review could serve as that alternative strategy.  
On the cost side, merit review would impose an additional barrier on the is-
suer, delaying the offering and imposing costs associated with the merit re-
view.  However, issuers could avoid this delay and expense by limiting their 
offering to sophisticated investors.  The SEC review process would also im-
pose costs on the SEC, but again, this review would only apply to private 
offerings to unsophisticated investors, not all offerings.  Additionally, the 
concern about supplanting private analysts would not be implicated in this 
context because analysts do not cover these types of offerings anyway.  Fi-
nally, by recruiting staff with experience advising start-up companies, the 
SEC could develop the expertise to ensure that the merit review process does 
not discriminate against companies with new technologies or business mod-
els.  On balance, I argue that the marginal costs of merit review would not 
exceed the marginal benefits and that it should not be stripped away from the 
hypothetical full regulation of private offerings to unsophisticated investors. 
My proposed change to the current regulation of private offerings to un-
sophisticated investors—drawn from a glass-half-empty analysis of securi-
ties regulation—is comparable to other scholars’ proposed reforms to the reg-
ulation of offerings.  For the reasons explained below, however, I contend 
that imposing both mandatory disclosure and SEC merit review of private 
offerings to unsophisticated investors is more fine-tuned to the problem of 
achieving price accuracy in these offerings than other scholars’ proposals, 
which were drawn from a glass-half-full approach. 
First, several scholars have argued that there should be enhanced disclo-
sures to unsophisticated investors in exempt offerings rather than merit re-
view of those offerings.  For example, Professor Palmiter argues that, because 
of the lack of intermediation and other protections for investors in the context 
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of the crowdfunding exemption, investors should receive enhanced price dis-
closure.136  Similarly, in the context of private offerings by “unicorns”—pri-
vate companies with valuations of at least one billion dollars137—Jennifer S. 
Fan has argued that certain financial disclosures, which are generally only 
available to major investors, should be posted on the unicorn’s website.138  
The problem with these scholars’ proposed solution is that it continues to rely 
on disclosure,139 which neglects the reality that unsophisticated investors may 
not read the disclosures.  Even if they do read them, they are unlikely to be 
able to analyze them meaningfully because of a lack of financial acumen or 
the existence of speculative fervor.  If these disclosures were made to the 
SEC instead, the SEC could act as an intermediary and perform merit review, 
focusing on price accuracy. 
Second, several scholars have argued for more limited federal preemp-
tion of state review of private securities offerings to unsophisticated inves-
tors,140 which would be a roundabout way of imposing merit review on these 
offerings.  For example, Jennifer J. Johnson argues that state regulation of 
offerings under Rule 506(b), the most widely used exemption from registra-
tion,141 should be limited to offerings by or to accredited institutional inves-
tors.142  Therefore, under Professor Johnson’s proposal, “[s]ales by unregu-
lated private entities such as limited partnerships to individual investors 
would be subject to state review.”143  Like my proposal, Professor Johnson’s 
proposal would subject some private offerings to unsophisticated investors to 
merit review, but only in those states with merit review statutes.144  I contend, 
however, that merit review would be better performed by the SEC than by 
the states.  By centralizing merit review, the SEC could develop the expertise 
to perform consistent and competent merit review.  States with merit review 
statutes vary dramatically with respect to whether they “have the practical 
ability to regulate,”145 both with respect to funding and expertise.146  Addi-
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tionally, decentralized merit review performed by multiple states risks incon-
sistent standards.147  Professor Johnson counters this concern about balkani-
zation in multistate offerings by arguing for an at-least-one-state standard, 
whereby only one state agency would be required to conduct state-level re-
view of the offering.148  This solution, while elegant, would not address the 
disparity in funding and expertise among state regulators.  Therefore, I con-
tend that the better proposal is to impose SEC merit review of all private 
offerings to unsophisticated investors. 
Third, Daniel J. Morrissey has argued for SEC merit review of all offer-
ings, not merely private offerings to unsophisticated investors.149  Drawing 
lessons from the 2008 financial crisis, he contends that the SEC should have 
the authority to “flat-out prohibit the sale of certain investments that pose 
undue risks to our entire economic system.”150  Unlike my proposal, Profes-
sor Morrissey’s does not differentiate the marginal costs and benefits of merit 
review for different categories of offerings.  His proposal would apply to fol-
low-on and PIPE offerings by public companies, IPOs, and private offerings 
to sophisticated investors.  As argued above,151 however, disclosure is suffi-
cient in those contexts to achieve a level of price accuracy.  Therefore, I con-
clude that my proposal is fine-tuned to those offerings where merit review’s 
marginal costs would not exceed its marginal benefits. 
Fourth, Professor Choi has proffered a unique proposal to regulate of-
ferings, not by issuer type, but by investor type.152  He identifies four groups 
of investors: 
(1) investors informed at the level of individual issuers (“issuer-
level” investors); (2) investors without information on particular 
issuers but informed about a range of securities intermediaries (“in-
termediary-level” investors); (3) investors with information only 
on certain highly-visible market participants, including nationally 
known individual intermediaries (“aggregate-level” investors); and 
(4) investors without information on any securities market partici-
pants (“unsophisticated” investors).153 
Investors in the fourth group would be channeled “to intermediaries able to 
negotiate for desired protections.”154  Like Professor Choi, I argue that unso-
phisticated investors should be channeled to an intermediary, but I argue that 
the SEC as merit regulator should be one such intermediary.  Under Professor 
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Choi’s proposal, “unsophisticated investors would be unable to purchase se-
curities other than through passive index funds regardless of the passage of 
any holding period.”155  By contrast, under my proposal, unsophisticated in-
vestors would not be foreclosed from investing in a wide variety of securities, 
including private placements, so long as the SEC had engaged in merit re-
view.  My proposal interposes an intermediary, as suggested by Professor 
Choi, but also allows issuers to raise capital from unsophisticated investors 
and allows unsophisticated investors to invest in a wider range of opportuni-
ties.  For those reasons, I contend that it is a better way of regulating offerings 
to unsophisticated investors. 
Finally, several scholars have argued for supplementing disclosure reg-
ulation, not with merit review, but with “substantive legislation that governs 
corporate behavior in a much more direct manner.”156  This substantive reg-
ulation would mandate beneficial corporate conduct and prohibit harmful 
corporate conduct.157  As a specific example, Professor Schwarcz argues for 
the prohibition of “material conflicts of interest in disclosure-impaired trans-
actions.”158  As even its proponents acknowledge, however, an attempt to 
substantively regulate corporate conduct with specific rules is potentially un-
der-inclusive and is often responsive to the most recent financial crisis as 
opposed to the next one.159  My proposal would permit the SEC to more nim-
bly adapt its mechanisms of merit review to respond to new complexities. 
 
*         *         * 
 
The glass-half-empty approach to securities regulation of offerings con-
firms that the current disclosure regime is appropriate for follow-on offerings 
and PIPE offerings by public companies, for IPOs, and for private offerings 
to sophisticated investors.  The half-glass-empty approach also demonstrates 
that, for private offerings to unsophisticated investors, disclosure alone is in-
sufficient to achieve price accuracy.  Rather, in this context, the approach 
demonstrates that the marginal costs of merit review would likely not exceed 
the marginal benefits.  Further, this proposed change is more fine-tuned to 
the problem of achieving price accuracy in these offerings than other schol-
ars’ proposals, which were drawn from a glass-half-full approach. 
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IV.  MANDATORY DISCLOSURE BY PUBLIC COMPANIES 
In this Part, I apply the glass-half-empty approach to mandatory disclo-
sure by public companies.  Just as in Part III, I define the hypothetical state 
of full regulation.  Then, I propose a methodology to remove regulation from 
that hypothetical state.  Finally, I apply the methodology, arguing that the 
results of the glass-half-empty approach support most aspects of the current 
mandatory disclosure regime.  I argue, however, that those results recom-
mend several discrete reforms: an adjustment to the trigger for Management 
Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) disclosure, a change to the mental state 
required to impose liability on an issuer, a recognition that the failure to com-
ply with MD&A disclosure is actionable as an omission, an abolition of the 
safe harbor for forward-looking information, and a change to the timing of 
risk disclosure. 
A.  Definition of “Full” Disclosure 
Under the glass-half-empty approach, I contend that “full” regulation of 
mandatory disclosure by public companies would require continuous disclo-
sure of all information about the firm.  This hypothetical state differs sub-
stantially from the current disclosure regime, which mandates certain disclo-
sures at the time of offering,160 certain disclosures quarterly161 and annually162 
thereafter, and certain disclosures on a current basis.163 
B.  Methodology to Remove Disclosure Requirements 
The methodology for removing disclosure requirements from this hypo-
thetical full state poses three analytical questions: First, why not remove all 
mandatory disclosure requirements?  Second, assuming that disclosure 
should be mandated, what substance should be required to be disclosed?  And 
finally, assuming that disclosures should be mandated and that certain sub-
stance should be required, how often should companies be required to make 
those disclosures? 
1.  Why Mandate Disclosure at All? 
Firms have incentives to voluntarily disclose information at issuance 
and to the aftermarket.  At issuance, firms recognize that, absent disclosure, 
investors may not invest in their securities at all or will discount those secu-
rities to take into account the lack of information.164  Moreover, investors are 
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likely to value securities higher if the company commits to engage in ongoing 
reporting about the state of the business, both because the investors will be 
better able to monitor the business and because such disclosures are likely to 
translate into a higher aftermarket price.  As explained by the Honorable 
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, “[a] firm that wants the highest 
possible price when it issues stock must take all cost-justified steps to make 
the stock valuable in the aftermarket, so it must make a believable pledge to 
continue disclosing.”165  
As numerous scholars have discussed, however, there are several poten-
tial market failures in a world of voluntary disclosure, such that issuers may 
not have sufficient incentives to disclose the optimal amount of infor-
mation—the level at which the marginal social costs of disclosure equal the 
marginal social benefits.166  First, some of the social benefits of disclosure 
may not be internalized by the firm.  Disclosure about one firm may provide 
benefits to another firm, such as by revealing industry-wide trends.167  Relat-
edly, those disclosures might not only help the other firm, but also hurt the 
disclosing firm competitively.168  Because the disclosing firm incurs the costs 
of such disclosures but does not internalize all of the benefits (which may 
exceed the costs), the firm may under-disclose. 
Second, the divergence between management’s interest in self-preser-
vation and society’s (including investors’) interest in disclosure of negative 
firm information may result in sub-optimal disclosure of negative infor-
mation.169  Management has a number of self-interested reasons for prefer-
ring not to disclose negative information, including compensation related to 
share price, retention of employment, and prevention of hostile take-overs 
and proxy contests.170  Therefore, management has incentives to delay or pre-
vent the disclosure of negative firm information.  Although management has 
countervailing incentives to disclose negative information in a timely way—
including “the need to establish and nurture an on-going corporate reputation 
for credibility to facilitate future capital-raising,” these incentives are often 
insufficient because of the “last period” problem.171  In other words, if the 
manager is not planning to be around to reap the benefits of the corporate 
reputation for credibility172 or if the company is not planning to raise more 
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capital,173 there may be insufficient incentives to disclose negative firm in-
formation. 
Furthermore, if a company remains silent rather than releasing negative 
information, shareholders cannot simply intuit that the undisclosed infor-
mation is negative.  First, there may be legitimate business reasons for not 
disclosing certain information, such as competitive reasons for not disclosing 
“information about a new product or a new technology.”174  As explained by 
Professor Fox, “[s]ilence is not a complete substitute for affirmatively dis-
closing a lack of good news because the market knows that an issuer could 
choose a low-disclosure regime for reasons other than a lack of good 
news.”175  Second, as explained by Joseph A. Franco, “[w]hen the total 
amount of information is undefined and open-ended, the disadvantaged party 
cannot readily infer that information is being concealed merely from observ-
ing the counterparty’s public disclosure.”176  Finally, management may lack 
the incentive to disclose positive news under certain circumstances, such as 
when undertaking a leveraged buy-out.177  This contributes to the messiness 
of silence as a signal, as well as depriving the market of the optimal amount 
of disclosure. 
Even if some issuers would disclose at the optimal level under a purely 
voluntary regime, rendering those disclosures mandatory as opposed to vol-
untary would impose only slight marginal costs, if any.  Indeed, some schol-
ars have described a rule compelling disclosures that would have been made 
voluntarily as “redundant”178 and theorized that “[t]he marginal direct cost of 
mandatory disclosure may be small.”179  Admittedly, if a mandatory disclo-
sure rule compelled disclosure in a format different from the one that an is-
suer would have chosen voluntarily, it could impose slight marginal costs of 
collection and disclosure.180  Those slight marginal costs could be offset, 
however, because greater standardization can lead to issuer costs savings: 
By imposing greater uniformity on disclosure requirements, man-
datory disclosure is likely to lead to greater economies of scale in 
the design of systems for the collection of such information (such 
as software systems), increase the size and mobility of the pool of 
disclosure professionals available to issuers, and lead to greater 
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cost competition in service providers, such as independent audi-
tors.181 
In addition, if disclosures are mandated in a standardized format, investors’ 
investment analysis costs are reduced.182  Finally, mandating disclosures re-
duces the negotiation costs between issuers and investors about the content 
and format of disclosure.183  Therefore, because of the potential for market 
failures in a purely voluntary regime and the slight marginal costs of mandat-
ing disclosures that would have been made voluntarily, I argue that, under 
the glass-half-empty approach, not all mandatory disclosures can be removed 
from the hypothetical full state of regulation.  Therefore, one must devise a 
methodology for identifying those disclosures that should be stripped away, 
based both on content and timing. 
2.  Test for Disclosures to be Removed 
Turning first to the content of mandatory disclosures, I argue that dis-
closures should be removed from the hypothetical state of full regulation (or, 
a regulatory scheme in which everything must be disclosed continuously) if 
the marginal social costs of a particular disclosure exceed its marginal social 
benefits.  This is essentially the converse of the test under the glass-half-full 
approach, which asks whether the marginal social benefits of a disclosure 
exceed its marginal social costs.184 
Calculating the marginal benefits of a particular disclosure encompasses 
two interrelated inquiries: (1) to what degree would price accuracy be en-
hanced by the disclosure; and (2) to what degree would enhanced price accu-
racy benefit society in this context?  The first inquiry should focus on how 
important the particular piece of information is to an accurate valuation of 
the security.185  The second inquiry should focus on the degree to which the 
aforementioned benefits of price accuracy—the efficient allocation of capi-
tal, the protection of investors, the reduced likelihood of bubbles, and the 
reduction of agency costs—will inure to society in the context of a particular 
disclosure.  For example, the benefit of efficient allocation of capital is di-
rectly linked to price accuracy at the time of issuance, but only indirectly 
linked in the secondary market.186  The benefits of a reduced likelihood of 
bubbles and reduction of agency costs, however, are more directly implicated 
by price accuracy in the secondary market than at the time of issuance.  The 
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benefit of protection of investors is likely equally implicated at the time of 
issuance and in the secondary market.  Therefore, I contend that the benefits 
of price accuracy are evenly split between the contexts of issuance and the 
secondary market.  This contention is consistent with the SEC’s policy of 
“equivalency,” which recognizes that information necessary for investment 
decisions should be similar for distribution and for trading markets.187  As 
such, when analyzing the marginal benefits of disclosure, the focus should be 
on the degree to which a particular disclosure would enhance price accuracy. 
Calculating the marginal costs of a particular disclosure requires an as-
sessment of both direct and indirect costs.  The direct costs include the costs 
of compiling the information and preparing the disclosure report,188 including 
management’s time and attorneys’ and accountants’ fees.189  The indirect 
costs include competitive costs due to competitors’ ability to profit from the 
disclosure190 and the lost productivity of management due to the diversion of 
time.191 
The accuracy of disclosure is intertwined with this cost-benefit analysis 
of the content of disclosure.  On the benefit side, for example, if a precise 
disclosure is significantly more helpful to price accuracy than an imprecise 
one, mandating perfectly accurate disclosure would greatly increase marginal 
benefits.  On the other end of the spectrum, if precision is not imperative to 
a disclosure’s bearing on price accuracy, mandating perfectly accurate dis-
closure would only minimally increase marginal social benefits.  On the cost 
side, the greater the degree of accuracy mandated, the higher the marginal 
compliance costs (or “precaution costs”).192  How the marginal costs and ben-
efits of various degrees of accuracy balance out depends on the particular 
disclosure.  The optimal degree of accuracy, therefore, is part and parcel of 
the mandatory disclosure analysis and varies by type of disclosure. 
The sanction imposed for violating that optimal degree of accuracy is a 
separate inquiry, however.  Although some scholars include liability costs for 
allegedly false or misleading disclosures as a cost of disclosure,193 others ig-
nore liability costs for purposes of identifying the optimal level of mandatory 
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disclosure, instead treating the question of appropriate sanction as a separate 
analytical question, as I do.194  For example, Professor Franco argues: 
 Strictly speaking, mandatory disclosure requirements are distinct 
from the imposition of liability on those who violate the require-
ments.  Indeed, the scope and content of a particular disclosure re-
quirement on the one hand and the optimal sanction for violation 
of those requirements on the other reflect very different policy con-
siderations.  Policies about disclosure content need not dictate pol-
icy with respect to liability standards.195 
I agree that designing the optimal disclosure regime is a separate inquiry from 
the system of sanctions implemented to enforce that regime.  For this reason, 
I focus on the former in this Part, including the optimal degree of accuracy 
with respect to each disclosure.  In the next Part, I address to the appropriate 
sanction for violating that optimal disclosure regime.196 
Turning second to the timing of mandatory disclosures, I argue that dis-
closures should be removed from the hypothetical state of full (or, continu-
ous) disclosure if the marginal social costs of requiring a particular disclosure 
to be updated constantly, as opposed to periodically, exceed the marginal so-
cial benefits.  The marginal benefits of real-time disclosure of a particular 
piece of information depend on (1) the degree to which the information af-
fects price accuracy197; and (2) the degree to which the information is likely 
to be dynamic, such that prior disclosures risk becoming stale and inaccu-
rate.198  The marginal costs of continuous, as opposed to periodic, disclosure 
depend on (1) the direct costs of compiling and reporting such information 
on a continuous basis199; and (2) the indirect costs associated with instanta-
neous as opposed to periodic reporting, such as the marginal competitive cost 
associated with losing temporary secrecy.200  If a piece of information is un-
likely to change rapidly, the marginal benefits of continuous disclosure are 
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 195.  Franco, supra note 176, at 336–37. 
 196.  See infra Part IV.  
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 200.  Franco, supra note 176, at 301 (explaining that a continuous disclosure regime could in-
crease the competitive costs of disclosure because “the commercial sensitivity of the information is 
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reduced, but so are the direct costs of compiling and reporting the infor-
mation.  Conversely, if a piece of information is dynamic, the marginal ben-
efits of continuous disclosure increase, but so do the marginal direct costs of 
making the disclosure. 
C.  Application of Methodology to Remove Mandatory Disclosures 
Applying this methodology to remove mandatory disclosures from the 
hypothetical full state of regulation (or, the continuous disclosure of all in-
formation) yields interesting insights about both the content and timing of 
required disclosures. 
1.  Content of Required Disclosures 
a.  Materiality Standard 
Mandated disclosure of certain content should be removed from the hy-
pothetical state of full regulation if the marginal social costs of mandating a 
particular disclosure exceed the marginal social benefits.  Under this meth-
odology, a broad swathe of mandated disclosures should be removed from 
the hypothetical state of full regulation: those that do not enhance price ac-
curacy.  If the content of a particular disclosure would not contribute to the 
accurate valuation of a security, the marginal costs will, per se, exceed the 
marginal benefits of the disclosure.  If a disclosure would enhance price ac-
curacy, then the analysis should proceed to consider the marginal benefits 
and marginal costs of mandating the disclosure. 
This provides a new perspective on the appropriateness of “materiality” 
as a disclosure trigger.  Under current law, disclosure requirements are often 
triggered by a materiality threshold, such as information “material to an un-
derstanding of the general development of the business,”201 “materially im-
portant physical properties of the registrant and its subsidiaries,”202 and “ma-
terial pending legal proceedings.”203  As defined by the Supreme Court, 
information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
investor would consider it important in making an investment decision.204  In 
another articulation, information is material if it would be viewed by the rea-
sonable investor as significantly altering “the ‘total mix’ of information made 
                                                          
 201.  17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a) (2016) (Reg. S-K). 
 202.  Id. § 229.102 (same). 
 203.  Id. § 229.103 (same). 
 204.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1987) (“We now expressly adopt the TSC In-
dustries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.”); TSC Indus., Inc. v. North-
way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (“An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”). 
 392 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:360 
available.”205  When this materiality standard is applied to contingent or spec-
ulative information, the Court applies a probability/magnitude test, which de-
pends “upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will 
occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the 
company activity.”206 
Applying the glass-half-empty approach, disclosures should not be 
mandated if they would not enhance price accuracy.  This analysis mimics 
the materiality standard because—when making an investment decision—a 
reasonable investor should only consider information that aids in valuation 
to be important.  Therefore, to the extent that immaterial information is not 
required to be disclosed under current law, the glass-half-empty analysis 
reaches the same result. 
The converse is not necessarily true, however.  Under the glass-half-
empty approach, even if disclosures would enhance price accuracy, they 
should not be required if the marginal costs of disclosure exceed the marginal 
benefits.207  Therefore, disclosure of some information, even if material, may 
not be warranted.  This suggests that the materiality trigger that applies to 
many disclosure requirements under current law may be over-inclusive. 
b.  MD&A Disclosure 
Applying the glass-half-empty approach also provides new perspectives 
on specific disclosure requirements.  For example, as part of Management 
Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 
(“MD&A”), a public company must disclose certain trends with respect to 
liquidity, capital resources, or results of operations that might affect the com-
pany’s financial condition or results of operations.208  The purpose of this 
disclosure is to provide information “necessary to an understanding of [the 
company’s] financial condition, changes in financial condition and results of 
operations.”209 
Under current law, this disclosure requirement is not triggered by the 
probability/magnitude materiality test.210  Rather, a company must engage in 
                                                          
 205.  TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449. 
 206.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d 
Cir. 1968)). 
 207.  See Langevoort, Information Technology, supra note 12, at 791 (“A useful presumption 
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lating the disclosure standard.”). 
 208.  17 C.F.R. §§ 229–303(a) (2016). 
 209.  Id. § 229.303(a).  
 210.  Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; 
Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 n.30 (May 18, 1989) (cod-
ified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241, and 271).  
 2017] A GLASS-HALF-EMPTY APPROACH 393 
a three-step analysis.  Step one: is the trend “known”?  If it is merely “antic-
ipated” as opposed to known, it need not be disclosed.211  If it is known, then 
the company must proceed to the second step.  Step two: is the trend “likely 
to come to fruition”?212  If not, no disclosure is required.  If it is likely to 
come to fruition, the company must proceed to the third step.  Step three: 
assuming that the trend comes to fruition, is “a material effect on the regis-
trant’s financial condition or results of operations . . . reasonably likely to oc-
cur[?]”213  If not, no disclosure is required.  If so, disclosure is required. 
This three-step analysis has been subject to significant criticism.  First, 
it does not require disclosure of all contingent or speculative information that 
would satisfy the probability/magnitude test for materiality.  If a trend is not 
likely to come to fruition, it need not be disclosed in the MD&A, regardless 
of its potential magnitude.214  By contrast, under the probability/magnitude 
test, even an unlikely eventuality is material if of sufficient magnitude.  Sec-
ond, the complexity of the analysis has been criticized as “failing on grounds 
of obscurity if not misdirection”215 and as “oxymoronic.”216 
Applying the glass-half-empty approach to MD&A, one must first de-
fine “full” disclosure of trends and uncertainties about liquidity, capital re-
sources, and results of operations.  This would require disclosure of both 
“known” and “anticipated” trends and uncertainties, regardless of their like-
lihood of coming to fruition or anticipated magnitude. 
Second, one must remove disclosures that would not enhance price ac-
curacy.  The probability/magnitude test—which identifies the subset of spec-
ulative information for which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasona-
ble investor would consider it important in making an investment decision—
informs this analysis.  If a trend or uncertainty fails the probability/magnitude 
test, it should be not mandated under the MD&A. 
Third, for those trends or uncertainties that satisfy the probability/mag-
nitude test, one must weigh the marginal costs of disclosure against the mar-
ginal benefits.  On the marginal benefits side, disclosure of trends and uncer-
tainties about liquidity, capital resources, and results of operations, to the 
extent they pass the probability/magnitude test, would enhance price accu-
racy because these topics relate directly to the company’s future cash flows.  
With respect to direct costs, the marginal collection costs should be minimal 
because anticipating these trends and uncertainties is fundamental to manag-
ing a business.  Indeed, the SEC has acknowledged that “one of the principal 
objectives of MD&A is to give readers a view of the company through the 
                                                          
 211.  Id.  
 212.  Id. at 22,430. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Mark S. Croft, MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclosure, 45 S.C. L. REV. 477, 483 (1994). 
 215.  Langevoort, Managing, supra note 51, at 1155. 
 216.  Croft, supra note 214, at 484. 
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eyes of management.”217  The marginal indirect costs associated with divert-
ing management’s time from other functions should likewise be minimal be-
cause it is difficult to imagine that there are significantly better uses of man-
agement’s time than anticipating these trends and uncertainties.  Finally, the 
company may experience marginal indirect competitive costs to the extent 
that other companies are able to adjust their business plans in light of these 
disclosures, but those marginal costs are almost certainly outweighed by the 
marginal benefits of disclosure. 
Therefore, the glass-half-empty analysis supports a revision to the 
MD&A disclosure standard: a trend or uncertainty with respect to liquidity, 
capital resources, or results of operations should be mandatorily disclosed to 
the extent that it passes the probability/magnitude materiality test.218  This 
test also benefits from being much easier to apply than the current MD&A 
test, which would lower reporting costs. 
c.  Degree of Accuracy 
The glass-half-empty analysis also lends new insights on the degree of 
accuracy that should be mandated for particular disclosures.  Degrees of ac-
curacy are mandated by liability standards—in particular, the duty, falsity, 
and mental state elements of liability.219  A hypothetical state of full regula-
tion would mandate completeness and accuracy with respect to each disclo-
sure, regardless of the issuer’s degree of care.  In other words, full regulation 
would impose strict liability on issuers for every misstatement or omission.  
Applying the glass-half-empty methodology, this strict liability standard of 
perfection should be lowered to the extent that the marginal costs achieved 
by this standard exceed the marginal benefits associated therewith.  There-
fore, the optimal liability standard should vary by type of disclosure. 
This conclusion is consistent with the current public and private liability 
scheme’s falsity element—which premises liability on a finding that a mis-
statement or omission is materially misleading.220  Because materiality is di-
rectly correlated with a misstatement or omission’s relevance to price accu-
racy,221 the degree of falsity required to trigger the materially misleading 
standard varies depending on the type of disclosure, requiring almost perfect 
                                                          
 217.  Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,060 (Dec. 29, 2003) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 211, 231 and 241).  
 218.  See Langevoort, Managing, supra note 51, at 1155 (arguing that MD&A disclosure should 
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accuracy for some types of disclosure and allowing for some degree of inac-
curacy for other types of disclosure.222 
This conclusion dramatically departs from the current liability scheme’s 
mental state element, however.  Under current law, the degree of care that an 
issuer must exercise in order to avoid liability when making a disclosure de-
pends not on the type of disclosure, but on the context of disclosure.  For 
example, in private litigation, despite the fact that registration statements and 
periodic reports contain many of the same types of disclosures, issuers are 
held to a strict liability standard for misrepresentations or omissions in regis-
tration statements223 but held to a quasi-knowledge224 or recklessness225 
standard for disclosures in periodic reports.  The glass-half-empty analysis 
demonstrates that this regime should be recalibrated based on the type of dis-
closure as opposed to the context of disclosure.  Therefore, contrary to current 
law, certain issuer disclosures in registration statements should be subject to 
a negligence or recklessness standard,226 and certain issuer disclosures in pe-
riodic reports should be subject to a negligence or strict liability standard.227 
Further, this analysis demonstrates that, contrary to current law, no man-
datory disclosures should be fully insulated from liability.  The marginal ben-
efits of a wholly unreliable disclosure are non-existent, and thus the marginal 
costs of such a disclosure will always exceed its marginal benefits.  Any man-
                                                          
 222.  Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 12, 1999) (explaining 
that, depending on the significance of the information, even a misstatement that is small in magni-
tude might nonetheless be material). 
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datory disclosure should thus be subject to some mandated degree of accu-
racy.228  Therefore, the current safe harbor for forward-looking statements,229 
which insulates issuers from liability for materially misleading mandatory 
disclosures even if they are made with actual knowledge of falsity,230 should 
be abolished.231 
This conclusion also lends new insights on the current liability scheme’s 
duty element, which is a prerequisite to liability for a material omission.232  If 
a disclosure is mandated, the failure to comply with that mandate should give 
rise to liability (assuming the other elements of the claim are met), lest the 
mandate be rendered meaningless.  Therefore, the circuit split over whether 
the MD&A disclosure requirement creates an actionable duty to speak233 
should be resolved in the affirmative.234  (Notably, if the MD&A disclosure 
trigger were adjusted to coincide with the materiality standard, as argued 
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above,235 courts’ discomfort with recognizing that Item 303 creates an action-
able duty might dissipate.236)  In short, a disclosure mandate without an en-
forcement mechanism is not a mandate.237 
Finally, I reject the argument that liability standards should be height-
ened above the optimal degree of accuracy because of the possibility of legal 
error in favor of liability.  For example, Professors Goshen and Parchomov-
sky—though conceding that a negligence liability standard for misstatements 
and omissions to the secondary market might be superior to a scienter stand-
ard—reject such a modification to the Exchange Act because of their sense 
that “courts sometimes over-enforce the statutory standard.”238  I reject this 
argument for two reasons.  First, although error is inevitable,239 I contend that 
any response to the potential for error in securities cases should have a theo-
retical basis and involve an inquiry into the likelihood and costs associated 
with error.  Under the typical articulation of error, false positives are Type I 
errors, and false negatives are Type II errors.240  As explained by Mark 
Moller, there are three theories about how to address error: (1) welfare utili-
tarianism, which focuses on minimizing error in the aggregate, without con-
cern about how the error is distributed; (2) strict egalitarianism, which seeks 
to “spread the risk of error evenly among all classes of litigants;” and (3) 
liberal egalitarianism, which “tolerate[s] an unequal distribution of error if 
doing so provides insurance against error for the least well off.”241  After 
choosing a theoretical basis for addressing error in securities cases, one must 
calculate the costs and likelihood of each type of error in order to determine 
whether an adjustment is merited.  While Type I errors impose corporate 
losses, Type II errors erode investor confidence, causing investors to discount 
the value of the securities market.242  In addition, Professors Goshen and Par-
chomovsky’s contention that Type I errors are more likely in securities cases 
is questionable.  As explained by Stephen M. Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati, 
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there are incentives for judges243 to use substantive law heuristics to summar-
ily dismiss securities claims.244  As such, courts might actually be more in-
clined to make Type II errors in securities cases. 
Second, I contend that any recalibration in response to the potential for 
Type I and Type II errors should be effectuated—not by adjusting liability 
standards—but by adjusting procedural rules such as pleading standards and 
burdens of proof.245  Indeed, one of the key goals of procedural rules is “to 
manage, and allocate, the risk of error—that is, the risk that deserving plain-
tiffs fail to recover their losses or innocent defendants pay plaintiffs for losses 
they did not cause.”246  By contrast, adjusting liability standards to address 
Type I and Type II rules would undercut the important signaling mechanism 
of the standards themselves247—to investors about the degree to which they 
should view disclosures as accurate and to issuers themselves about the de-
gree of care that should be paid when making disclosures.248  Therefore, for 
both of these reasons, I reject a lowering of the liability standard to take into 
account the possibility of Type I errors. 
2.  Timing of Required Disclosures 
With respect to timing, disclosures should be removed from the hypo-
thetical state of full (or, continuous) disclosure if the marginal social costs of 
requiring a particular disclosure to be updated constantly exceed the marginal 
social benefits.  This approach is consistent with Professor Franco’s nuanced 
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proposal to “seek to make disclosure in particular areas more current without 
necessarily resorting to a continuous disclosure requirement.”249 
Applying this methodology largely supports the current timing of dis-
closure requirements.  First, the continuous disclosure requirements should 
be removed for information that, despite its importance to price accuracy, 
would be cost-prohibitive to disclose on a continuous basis.250  A quintessen-
tial example of information in this category is audited financial statements.  
Therefore, consistent with the current disclosure regime, disclosure of au-
dited financials should only be required on an annual basis.251  Second, the 
continuous disclosure requirements should not be removed for information 
that is both highly significant to price accuracy and likely to render prior dis-
closures stale, even if such disclosures impose some costs.  Therefore, the 
current real-time disclosure requirements—including disclosure about entry 
into or termination of a material definitive agreement, acquisition or disposi-
tion of a significant amount of assets, and a material charge for impairment 
to an asset252—are justified. 
This methodology also suggests certain discrete adjustments to the cur-
rent disclosure regime.  For example, the risks facing a business are funda-
mental to price accuracy and are potentially dynamic.  At the same time, the 
marginal collection costs of requiring continuous as opposed to periodic dis-
closure of risks should not be excessive.  As recognized by Professor Lange-
voort, “[t]hose risks are already (or should be) known to management; man-
agement’s primary job is to respond strategically to them.”253  Although 
continuous risk disclosure might impose some marginal competitive costs, 
those would likely be outweighed by the marginal benefits of ongoing risk 
disclosure.  Therefore, the glass-half-empty analysis supports Professor 
Langevoort’s proposal to mandate ongoing risk disclosure.254 
V.  PUBLIC COMPANY SANCTIONS FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS 
As discussed above,255 the optimal liability standard is part and parcel 
of the optimal level of disclosure because the degree of accuracy affects both 
the marginal costs and the marginal benefits of disclosure.  Once the optimal 
liability standard is identified, however, the optimal level of sanctions for 
violating that liability standard is a separate inquiry.  In this Part, I apply the 
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glass-half-empty approach to public company sanctions for misrepresenta-
tions and omissions, arguing that the results support a new sanction regime 
for misrepresentations to the secondary market. 
A.  Definition of “Full” Sanctions 
The hypothetical state of “full” sanctions for violating liability standards 
is the imposition of sanctions so high as to bankrupt the business.  Although 
this is merely a thought experiment, it is not beyond the realm of possibility.  
Indeed, in some instances, the current imposition of out-of-pocket damages 
in open-market securities fraud class actions has the potential to threaten just 
that.256 
B.  Methodology to Remove Sanctions 
Sanctions should be removed from the hypothetical state of full regula-
tion (or, business viability-threatening sanctions) to the extent that such sanc-
tions would distort issuers’ compliance with the optimal degree of accuracy 
identified above.  The resulting sanctions should incentivize issuers to com-
ply with the above-identified optimal degree of accuracy.257  In order to in-
centivize an issuer to comply, the amount of sanctions should exceed the is-
suer’s expected benefits from non-compliance, multiplied by a factor to take 
into account the likelihood of escaping liability because of non-detection or 
Type II error.258  The issuer’s expected benefits are two-fold, any direct ben-
efits inuring to the issuer from the misstatement or omission plus the issuer’s 
saved costs from non-compliance with the optimal degree of accuracy.259  For 
example, if the issuer would benefit $100 and save $50 in collection costs by 
not complying and would face a fifty percent chance of being held liable for 
non-compliance, the sanction should exceed $300.  However, the sanction 
should not exceed this amount by so much as to incentivize over-compliance.  
If sanctions are excessive, issuers fearing Type I errors might over-comply,260 
causing the marginal costs of disclosure to exceed the marginal benefits 
                                                          
 256.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why 
“Exit” Works Better Than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 432 (2008) (explaining that the 
hypothetical damages in a securities class action could, if imposed, force the corporation to file for 
bankruptcy protection). 
 257.  Rose, supra note 245, at 2188 (“Determining the scope of the substantive legal prohibition 
is but one step in constructing a securities fraud deterrence regime.  The credible threat of sanctions 
is the means by which the prohibition influences behavior.  Sanction setting itself requires a difficult 
balancing of under- and overdeterrence costs.”). 
 258.  See Langevoort, Capping, supra note 226, at 653; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 219, 
at 619. 
 259.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 219, at 619. 
 260.  Rose, supra note 245, at 2184. 
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thereof.261  The balance between the sanction multiplier (to take into account 
the likelihood of Type II errors) and the avoidance of excessive sanctions (to 
take into account the likelihood of Type I errors) depends on how the proce-
dural rules impact the likelihood of each type of error. 
Notably, unlike many scholars,262 I am not including as a cost of sanc-
tions the social cost of chilling issuers’ voluntary disclosures.   For example, 
Edmund W. Kitch argues, “[s]aying less means litigating less and being held 
liable less often.  Liability is the cost of the activity of making statements, 
and will reduce the level of that activity.”263  I reject this argument for pur-
poses of calculating the costs of sanctions.  On the contrary, under the man-
datory disclosure regime crafted above in Part IV, all disclosures whose mar-
ginal benefits exceed their marginal costs would be mandated.264  Therefore, 
even if the imposition of sanctions for affirmative misstatements would chill 
some voluntary disclosures, the marginal benefits of those disclosures—if 
they had been made—would not exceed the marginal costs thereof. 
Finally, I address the optimal level of sanctions in the aggregate, assum-
ing that the current multi-enforcer approach265 could be calibrated to ensure 
that an issuer’s aggregate sanctions would equate to the optimal level.266 
C.  Application of Methodology to Remove Sanctions 
Applying this methodology to the hypothetical state of “full” regulation 
(in other words, sanctions so high as to bankrupt the business) depends on 
whether an issuer’s failure to comply with the requisite degree of accuracy 
occurs in the context of offering materials or disclosures to the secondary 
market.  In each context, I will assume that the issuer, by failing to comply 
with the optimal degree of accuracy, either made unduly positive disclosures 
or failed to disclose negative information.  By necessity, this discussion is 
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theoretical as opposed to concrete because so many of the variables are un-
measurable,267 but the analysis nonetheless yields meaningful insights on the 
appropriate level of sanctions. 
In the context of offering materials, sanctions should be removed from 
the hypothetical state of “full” regulation to a level that incentivizes the issuer 
to comply with the optimal degree of accuracy without incentivizing over-
compliance.  The issuer benefits from selling its securities at a price higher 
than if it had complied.  The issuer also benefits from saving the costs asso-
ciated with ensuring accuracy and completion with the requisite care.  In or-
der to incentivize the issuer to comply with the requisite degree of accuracy, 
the sanction should exceed these benefits, multiplied by the likelihood that 
the issuer would not be subject to liability for failing to comply. 
This methodology largely supports the current private remedy for issu-
ers’ misstatements and omissions in registration statements.  Under Section 
11 of the Securities Act, issuers are liable for out-of-pocket damages, calcu-
lated as the difference between the price paid for the securities and the value 
once the truth was revealed, reduced to the extent that issuer “proves that any 
portion or all of such damages represents other than the depreciation in value 
of such security” resulting from the misstatement or omission.268  In other 
words, Section 11 imposes damages for the amount by which the offer price 
was elevated by the misstatement or omission.  This over-counts the benefit 
to an issuer from selling its securities at an unduly high price because the 
issuer does not recoup the entire selling price of its securities (in light of the 
payment to the underwriters).  However, once the issuer’s saved costs from 
non-compliance and the multiplier are taken into account, this measure may 
appropriately incentivize an issuer to comply, without incentivizing the issuer 
to over-comply.269 
Turning to the context of disclosures to the secondary market, sanctions 
should be removed from the hypothetical state of “full” regulation to a level 
that incentivizes the issuer to comply with the optimal degree of accuracy, 
without incentivizing over-compliance.  In this context, the issuer’s benefits 
from non-compliance are less obvious because the issuer does not directly 
benefit from the inflated market price.270  The issuer may indirectly benefit, 
however, from “incidental tax benefits, lower costs of capital, protection 
                                                          
 267.  Langevoort, Capping, supra note 226, at 657 (“The variables are impossible to measure 
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from hostile takeovers, temporary business advantages, and increased pub-
licity.”271  Of course, as in the context of offerings, the issuer also benefits 
from saving the costs associated with ensuring accuracy and completion with 
the requisite care.  In order to incentivize the issuer to comply with the req-
uisite degree of accuracy, the sanction should exceed these benefits, multi-
plied by the likelihood that the issuer would not be subject to liability for 
failing to comply. 
This methodology suggests that the current private remedy for issuer’s 
misstatements and omissions in periodic reports is excessive, incentivizing 
over-compliance.272  Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, issuers are 
potentially liable for out-of-pocket damages, measured by the difference be-
tween the price paid and the true value of the security if it had been unaffected 
by fraud.273  Such a damage measure would only make sense if there were a 
remote chance of liability, meriting a very large multiplier.  Indeed, as rec-
ognized by Professor Langevoort, 
There is little reason to believe that, just by coincidence, the aggre-
gate out-of-pocket measure will be equal to or less than the optimal 
deterrence measure.  Much more likely, it will be excessive in 
terms of deterrence, leading to overprecaution through muted dis-
closure or silence as a result of fear of draconian liability.274 
Therefore, this methodology supports a revision of the damages measure for 
misstatements and omissions in periodic reports.  Because the calculation of 
the appropriate level of sanctions would involve a “wildly indeterminate and 
uneven” attempt to calculate the issuer’s benefit from non-compliance,275 the 
best option may be to impose a floating damage cap.276 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
My objectives with this Article are two-fold.  First, I hope that the glass-
half-empty approach, alongside the traditional glass-half-full approach, will 
become an integral part of future scholarly analysis about the appropriate 
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bounds of securities regulation.  Second, I hope that the insights that this ap-
proach reveals in the contexts of regulation of offerings, mandatory disclo-
sure by public companies, and public company sanctions for misstatements 
and omissions will be incorporated into future reforms of securities regula-
tion, leading to a more comprehensive, coherent, and unbiased regulatory 
scheme that furthers the goal of accuracy in securities pricing. 
 
